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The assumption that the experiences of Western societies are the
inevitable path for development in African1 societies has for
long guided demographic studies of African fertility and repro-
ductive behaviour. Valid explanations of African fertility remain
elusive partly because African demography has not seriously con-
tested this assumption. This paper examines the problems in the
explanations of fertility and reproductive behaviour in Africa
from a demographic perspective. Two characteristics distinguish
African fertility from fertility in other regions of the world.
First, the level of fertility in the African region is the
highest in the world. The most recent summary fertility data in
Table 1 and the country figures in Table 2 show that the average
African woman will have six children by the time she is 44 years
old. Total fertility rate is clearly over 6 for most of the
African countries shown. Secondly, Africa is the only region with
no strong evidence of a systematic downward trend in fertility.
In the last 30 years, considerable fertility decline has occurred
in other regions of the Third World. From the second half of the
1960s to the beginning of the 1990s, fertility levels in the
Third World fell by over 30%, with Eastern Asia experiencing the
most rapid decline. Until the past five years, no evidence
existed on national or sub-regional fertility decline in Africa
with the exception of South Africa.
1
 Unless otherwise stated, Africa in this paper refers to Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Beyond -these two features, recent reviews (Cochrane and Farid,
1989; Van de Walle and Foster, 1990) indicate that there exists
no strong coherent body of knowledge on the determinants of
fertility. Socioeconomic and cultural determinants of African
fertility have been widely studies but there are differences in
opinions about the relative contribution of these socioeconomic
factors and cultural factors. There is little clarity about the
effect of social and economic factors on African fertility.
Education and urbanization effects are not as linear as expected.
(Ashurst et al, 1984; United Nations, 1987a; Cleland and
Rodriguez, 1988, Chimere-Dan, 1990). Neither relatively stable
economy nor economic crises has so far shown important clear
effects on African fertility. Non-western institutions such as
polygyny and extended family network are associated with African
fertility in ways that have not been clearly explained. Family
planning programmes have, as yet, no discernible pattern of
association with fertility in those African countries where they
have a relatively long history.
Dominant theoretical approaches
Two sets of ideas shaped approaches to fertility in general and
African fertility in particular. One of the earliest articulated
provocative views on population was Nalthus* pessimism about the
consequences of the inverse relationship between the rate of
population growth and the means of economic sustenance. His Essay
on the Principle of Population (1798) was a reaction to the
English and French Utopians of his time. Inspired by the poor
social conditions in England, Maithus argued that population has
a tendency to grow at a faster rate than the rate of increase in
the means of subsistence. It was his view that unless people
adopted preventive checks - late marriage and restrained from
prolific childbearing, positive checks (e.g., poverty, diseases,
epidemics, famine and wars) will result from rapid population
growth. Malthus did not foresee the power of technological
advances that in many societies altered the ratio of people to
means of subsistence. In focusing exclusively on the relationship
between population and agriculture, he has been accused of
defending the interests of English land-owning class of the late
18th century. The most obvious contradiction of his predictions
was the simultaneous increase in population and prosperity in
19th century Europe. Despite the theoretical and empirical
weaknesses of this position, Halthusian thinkers today emphasize
the threat posed to human survival by a high rate of fertility in
the Third World. Their ideas gave legitimacy to the concepts of
"overpopulation" and "the population time bomb". Especially in
policy making circles, the list of Malthus1 preventive checks
were expanded by Neo-Malthusians to include the use of contracep-
tives.
The other major theoretical orientation is the theory of demogra-
phic transition which was first sketched in the 1920s and devel-
oped later by Notestein. This theory sees transition of fertility
and mortality from high to low levels as an inevitable conse-
quence of movement from traditionalism to modernity. In the first
stage of this transition, fertility and mortality levels are
high. In a second stage, mortality declines but without a sig-
nificant decline in fertility with the result that population
growth rate is high. The last stage is when fertility begins to
decline alongside mortality. Demographic transition is complete
when both fertility and mortality fluctuate at very low levels
(See figure 1) . The theory was summarized by Demeny (1968) as
follows:
In traditional societies fertility and mortality are
high. In modern societies fertility and mortality are
low. In between, there is demographic transition.
In a further exposition of the theory* Coale (1973,p.65) stated
the following three preconditions for a substantial decline in
fertility:
(1)Fertility must be within the calculus of conscious
choice. Potential parents must consider it an accept-
able mode of thought and form of behaviour to balance
advantages and disadvantages before deciding to have
another child..
(2) Reduced fertility must be advantageous. Perceived
social and economic circumstances must make reduced
fertility seen an advantage to individual couples.
(3)Effective techniques of fertility reduction must be
available.
The theory is analogous to Rostow's stages of economic growth in
economics and reflected the prevailing intellectual climate of
the 1940s and 50s and the fascination with the construction of
general deterministic models of social and economic progress.
An assessment of the relevance of the transition theory to the
Third World countries has been carried out by Beaver (1975). It
is not a theory in a strict sense. It is merely a description of
a pattern of demographic change in the specific European context.
Its understanding and definitions of several concepts such as
development, attitudes, values and rationality are culturally
biased. It is ahistorical. It fails to recognize the social
foundations of African reproductive systems. In summary tran-
sition theorists make an a prori assumption that African fer-
tility will follow the pattern of European fertility transition,
a position which is hard to sustain presently.
Contemporary explanations of fertility are based on the theory of
demographic transition with a bias to economics. In general,
economic approaches argue that fertility levels follow the
principles of demand and supply. Versions of economic thinking on
fertility in the literature range from plain economic determinism
(Easterlin, 1975, 1978, Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985) to refined
postulations about social dimension of the cost of childbearing,
changes in lifestyle and shifts in time constraints of having
children (Lee and Miller, 1991; Donaldson, 1991).
Sociological contribution to the explanations of fertility look
at the influences of social structure, institutions (Davis, 1955,
McNicoll) and culture (Lorimer, 1954, Warwick, 1988). The most
popular framework for sociological analysis of fertility was
produced by Davis and Blake (1956). Surprisingly critical
sociology has not shown sufficient interest on this subject which
falls within its field of inquiry. Although there have been a
few structualist work in fertility (see Harthworth, 1978),
sociological approaches to fertility tend to be dominated by
functionalist and linear views of social change. These "modern-
ization" views have been a target of marxist thinkers who rather
see fertility and reproductive behaviour as ideologically con-
strained social phenomena. Marxists place emphasis on the class
location of reproductive behaviour. Explanation of modes of
production, social and class relations of production by default
explains reproductive behaviour (Hacfarlane, Mamdani, 1981,
Meillassoux, 1983, Seccombe, 1983). This is a distinct contribu-
tion which gets blurred by any further steps to explain house-
hold economic dynamics that are associated with fertility. Once
the issue of household labour organization, gender and intra-
class fertility behaviour are taken up, marxist analysis unwit-
tingly adopts a economic reductionist approach to fertility.
Besides, the marxist approach is particularly weak in accounting
for or integrating the household-based individual-level interac-
tions of fertility and economy.
The individual-level biological component of fertility is linked
to the social dimension by biosocial approaches that employ
powerful techniques of individual-level accounting of biological
and social determinants of fertility change (Bongaarts, 1978,
Bongaarts and Potter, 1983; Hobcraft and Little 1984, Menken,
1989). The biosocial approach has provided some insight into the
proximate routes through which social factors influence fertil-
ity, nonetheless within the framework of demographic transition
theory. (Page and Lesthaeghe, 1981, Bongaarts et al 1984;
Bongaarts and Frank 1991).
Studies in African fertility
Since the early 1960s, studies in African fertility have focused
on two questions, namely, why fertility level is high and how it
can be reduced. In the early 1970s a series of studies designed
to measure knowledge of, attitude to and practice of contracep-
tion (KAP) among African women were carried out in West and
Middle Africa. In the same period, the Population Council funded
the Changing African Family Project with an emphasis on "change
in fertility control or on "changes which may precede changes in
fertility control". In a document that gave direction to the
African component of the World Fertility Survey, Caldwell (1974)
identified nine priority areas of fertility research in Africa
as:
a. Search for better fertility measures.
b. Production of KAP-type information for francophone Africa.
c. Establishment of links between anti-natal practices and
fertility levels.
d. Measurement of change over time in KAP indicators.
e. Search for how fertility decline or contraception or abortion
practice starts.
f. Search for better understanding of economics of family size at
the family level.
g. Measurement of change over time in the spread of antinatal
practices.
h. Studies in the relationship between attitude,intentions and
practice of fertility limitation.
i. Examination of the link between children education and fertil-
ity limitation.
These surveys are of central importance in African demography.
They initiated the practice of surveying African societies on a
large-scale with the belief that this approach can generate valid
information. Secondly, the KAP and the World Fertility Surveys
played a more subtle role. They introduced new concepts, ideas,
and models around fertility and reproductive behaviour. The
questionnaires and training provided to field workers equipped
them not only as information gatherers but also as transmitters
of Western norms of small family and alternative reproductive
behaviour. Problems of contexualization of concepts, poor meas-
urement, language and meaning were encountered in both the KAP
and WFS in Africa. In retrospect, it is not entirely certain that
these surveys contained the relevant data for adequate explana-
tions of African fertility. The validity of findings based on the
concept of KAP is suspect (Westoff, 1988). Despite the fact that
the WFS is the most ambitious social science data gathering
exercise in the 2 0th century, its African component left more
questions unanswered than it started with. There were false hopes
that the Demographic and Health Surveys that followed (1986-1992)
would take explanations further. The DHS followed a biomedical
emphasis and in some respects provided less sociologically
relevant data for the explanation of African fertility. Although
they had major social science inputs at all stages, the KAP, WFS
and DHS projects in Africa had two general flaws that undermine
their contribution to the explanation of fertility and reproduc-
tive behaviour. The quality of information they provided was poor
(UN, 1987b) and they lacked a strong theoretical base or focus.
Volumes of papers and reports have been published using informa-
tion from these major cross-national surveys without major
explanatory innovations with respect to fertility behaviour.
Although not clearly visible, three strands of conclusions are
found in existing literature on African fertility. The first is
that African fertility is high because of low level socio-econ-
omic development. The second is that African fertility high and
remains so because traditional pronatalist African culture which
is inherently resistant to the idea of family limitation. Where
some changes have been observed in African fertility, a third
view attributes this to ideational rather than socio-economic or
cultural factors. These explanations arise from the same presup-
positions within the framework of the transition theory. Collec-
tive, they are results of the comparison of African fertility
with Western models instead of examining fertility in its own
right as a social phenomenon.
A major attempt to part with the traditional transition frame-
work is Caldwell's hypothesis which was published under the
ambitious title "A theory of fertility decline" (1982). with
predominantly African data, Caldwell 1976, 1982) points out that
though important, economic rationality is not the rationality in
African reproductive system. Refinement of his ideas situates
explanations of fertility and reproductive behaviour in the
direction of intergenerational flow of household wealth (1982).
In the present regime of high fertility in Africa, wealth flows
from children to parents, hence the high economic value of
children. African fertility will decline significantly when there
is a flow of wealth from parents to children, which by implica-
tion raises the economic cost of childbearing.
In a subsequent work (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987) he emphasised
the African cultural contexts (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987) and
institutional factors (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1988) as pivotal in
the understanding of African fertility. Caldwell views and
writings on African fertility are as diverse as changes in his
residence in different regions, professional and research activ-
ities. He doubts the suitability of the survey methodology for
investigating African reproductive systems (Caldwell and Hill,
1988) and is pessimistic about the prospects for a sustained
fertility decline in Africa without rapid economic growth
(Caldwell, 1991). Considered as a whole, he comes nearest to
questioning the assumptions underlying research on fertility in
Africa. He challenges the uncritical importation of Western
Judeo-Christian tradition and the concept of rationality into the
different African situation. However, his wealth flow hypothesis
is essentially a derivative of the transition theory with added
anthropological insight and content. His work reflect acceptance
of the presupposition that African societies will necessarily
share the same routes to modernity with Western countries. In
this sense the wealth flow hypothesis is merely an exposition of
an aspect of the transition theory from the perspective of
economic anthropology.
Malthusian ideas recently appeared in the form of "crisis-led
fertility transition". This is the hypothesis that if people do
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not reduce their family size under normal circumstances, they
will do so when they face economic crises. Boserup (1985, 1986)
makes an explicit and direct application of this hypothesis to
African fertility. She sees the economic crisis in large parts of
Africa as a factor that will probably make family planning
acceptable to African families. She says (1986, p. 256),
"in those developing countries, which have become
heavily dependent upon export of manufactures, or
remittances by migrants, or capital inputs, the choice
between options is narrowing. This situation is likely
to force many families to choose fertility control as
the means of reducing their expenditure. Some African
countries including Ghana, have for a long time suf-
fered from a severe economic crisis, while in others,
including Kenya, economic growth has been strong until
recently. This may help to explain why use of family-
planning services is more widespread in Ghana than in
Kenya..".
The crisis hypothesis employs the compelling evidence on recent
trends in socioeconomic explanatory variables to contradict some
basic propositions of theory in Africa. However this hypothesis
is highly speculative. It is based on no evidence of an African
country where a sustained fertility decline has begun as a result
of economic crisis. Kenya, Zimbabwe and Botswana, the three coun-
tries believed to be experiencing some downward shift in fertil-
ity are comparatively the most successful economies with the
exception of South Africa The examples of Ghana and Kenya cited
by Boserup (loc. cit.) are today an embarrassment, if not
outright negation of the crisis transition thesis. There is
evidence of some decline in Kenyan fertility (Robinson, 1992)
whereas no such trend has been reported for Ghana, the more
impoverished of the two economies. Similarly, indications of an
onset of fertility decline are reported not in the Western or
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Central Africa but in the Southern African and more countries of
South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. In the specific case of
South African, it has been argued by Chimere-Dan (1993) that among
blacks, the socio-economic crises of racial domination and
apartheid rule did not expedite but rather delayed fertility
transition. If and where it occurs in Africa, crisis-led
fertility transition is likely to can be temporary, incomplete
and potentially reversible.
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the crisis-led transition
hypothesis presents a significant challenge to the established
mode of thinking about fertility in Africa. If the expected
modernization and socioeconomic development posited by the
transition theory as necessary conditions for a decline in
African fertility are slow materialize, the 'crisis-led tran-
sition" hypothesis suggests a potentially quicker route to
achieve rapid fertility in the region.
Towards an explanatory framework
Two possible new directions in fertility research briefly intro-
duced here. The first is to locate fertility in the changing
nature of social organization of reproduction in African
societies. Political and economic changes at the regional and
national levels affect social organization of African reproduc-
tion. Some of these effects are time-specific while others
translate into processes over time. Some of these changes affect
couples more directly than they affect communities, while some of
the changes have their maximum impacts on social groups. Overall,
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these changes alter the social milieu and social organization of
reproduction in African societies. Investigations of the nature
and changes in the social organization of reproduction will shed
light into social dynamic of fertility and reproductive behav-
iour. Lesthaeghe (1989) points out specific elements in societal
re-organization such as the introduction of cash crops, agricul-
tural expansions, changes in labour organization , expansion of
education and westernization that have significant impacts on
organization of reproduction in Africa. He correctly points out
that African reproductive system shows uneven and diversified
adaptations to social, economic and cultural change. These
unevenness and diversities should constitute the first target of
inquiries in efforts to explain African fertility.
Investigations at this level should address society's adaptive
strategy in an ever changing social order. In line with this
view, Kraeger (1986) argues for better understanding of demo-
graphic regimes or existing social organizations of reproduction
which, seen as cultural systems, perform the three tasks of (i)
recruiting components of social structure, (ii) offering compara-
tive levers for meaningful institutional analysis, and (iii)
being used for self-definition and group identification. In line
with this argument, understanding of African fertility behaviour
should be predicated in clearly delineated demographic regimes
which permit a clear view of how social institutions and struc-
tures impinge on groups, and how fertility behaviour is an
integral part of society's reaction to the past and adjustment of
the present.
One can think of three broad regimes in Africa defined by the
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nature and intensity of exogenous influences on the social
organization of reproduction. First is the pre- and ancient
history for which we have little or no fertility data. From the
16th to about the middle of the 20th century can be characterized
as a regime that saw cross-cultural contacts, environmental and
technological changes which African social organization of
reproduction had to react and adjust to. Many contemporary
African societies can be classified into a third regime where
more pressure is placed on the social organization of reproduc-
tion by state policies favouring a small family and the use of
modern contraceptives, in this regime, the response of the
African social organization of reproduction should be studied as
a case of induced forced social change.
The second potentially fruitful line of inquiry is investigation
of African fertility and reproductive patterns as collective
behaviour (Bulato and Bos, 1989) within a prevailing reproductive
regime. Since collective behaviour is hardly institutionalized,
this approach can permit measurement of group behaviour alongside
the more common practice of individual-level measurement of
fertility.
Criteria for group definition is important. In conventional
categorization, group is defined as categories sharing for
instance the same socio-economic status, educational level, age
and ethnicity. To maximize insight from the orientation suggested
here, these categories may be too rigid to maximize the chances
of tapping into the dynamics of group behaviour in reproductive
behaviour.
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This approach however raises the problem of duality in fertility
research. Fertility is both an individual and societal affair, A
potential problem is again whether the observed fertility pattern
is the sum of individual behaviour or whether groups and society
at large have fertility and reproductive behaviour that cannot
be reduced to the behaviour of individuals in a particular social
context. The problem raised here is the debate between psychology
and sociology which remains to be resolved by social psychology.
Approaching African fertility and reproductive behaviour from the
framework of collective behaviour allows for deeper investiga-
tions of outstanding issues in the ideational correlates of
fertility dynamics. For instance, Caldwell (1982) contends that
the focus of attention should not be education per se but the
nature (i.e. curriculum) and content of learning provided in
Africa, not just innovative ideas, but specific types new ideas
(fertility control; Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987) as fertility
determinants.
In summary, after over 30 years of active demographic research on
Africa, search for powerful theories to explain African fertility
and reproductive behaviour has barely started. Demographic
studies of African societies have so far achieved more success in
measurement and description than in the explanation of fertility.
Common in the literature are the ideas that African fertility is
determined by socioeconomic development (Caldwell, 1991), culture
(Van de Walle and Omideyi, 1988) or ideational change (Cleland
and Hobcraft, 1988). It is suggested here that careful
15
examination of the nature of social organization of childbearing
in clearly defined reproductive regimes which is informed by
theories of collective behaviour can advance knowledge of African
fertility and reproductive behaviour.
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Table 1. Total fertility rate for four Third World regions
REGION TOTAL FERTILITY RATE
Sub-Saharan Africa1 6.0
Near East & North Africa2 4.8
Latin America & Caribbean3 4.0
Asia & Pacific4 3.5
Notes
These are averages calculated from the most recent fertility data
for the countries in each region. With few exceptions these data
are from the Demographic and Health Survey results for different
countries. The surveys were conducted from 1986 to 1992.
1. 19 countries; Botswana (1988), Burundi (1987), Cameroon
(1991), Ghana (1988), Kenya (1989), Liberia (1986), Magi
(1987), Namibia (1992), Niger (1992), Nigeria (1990), Sene-
gal (1986), South Africa (1987-89), Sudan (1989-90), Swazil-
and (1988), Tanzania (1991-92), Togo (1988), Uganda (1988-
98), Zambia (1992) and Zimbabwe (1988-89).
2. 6 countries; Egypt (1988-89), Jordan (1990), Morocco (1992),
Tunisia (1988), Turkey (1988) and Yemen (1991-92).
3. 15 countries including Belize (1991), Bolivia (1989), Brazil
(1986), Colombia (1990), Costa Rica (1986), Dominican Repub-
lic (1991), Ecuador (1989), El Salvador (1988), Guatemala
(1987), Haiti (1989), Jamica (1989), Mexico (1987), Paraguay
(1990), Peru (1991-92) and Trinidad & Tobago (1987).
4. 10 countries: Bangladesh (1991), China (1988), India (1988),
Indonesia (1991) Republic of Korea (1988), Pakistan (1990-
91), Philippines (1988), Sari Lanka (1987), Thailand (1987)
and Vietnam (1988).
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys Newsletter. Vol. 5, No. 2,
1993. macro International Inc. Maryland.
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* Except South African figure, these were calculated using
births to women aged 15-44 in the three years before the survey
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys Newsletter. Vol. 5, No.
2, 1993. macro International Inc. Maryland; Chimere-Dan (1993).
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